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There is a dearth of textbooks leading up to the
style of sociology exemplified by, among others, the
European Sociological Review: a clever problem choice,
systematic theorizing, and rigorous testing. American
textbooks present sociology as a grab bag of topics, the
theories in British treatises are so liquid that students
may wish for a bar of soap, and German tomes are so
concerned with the conditions for the possibility of
sociology that sociology’s research findings take the
back seat. The French book under review fills this gap
to a large extent. If more of its examples had been
taken from English publications, a translation into that
language might have been a hit.
The book aims to provide a tool box for those who
wish to analyze individual behavior from a sociological
perspective, and does so by starting from the assumption
that individuals act with a minimum of intentions (a
synonym for purposes). It distances itself from narrowly
conceived rational choice explanations, and dissects as
well as synthesizes a large number of highlights from half
a century of sociological studies. The examples include
field work in developing countries, archival research,
and network mapping. To achieve their aim of synthesis,
the authors disavow the holistic concept of culture and
define culture as shared beliefs, so that analytical exer-
cises at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels become
possible by specifying who does the sharing. The first
part of the book (Chapters 1–4) is an introduction and
shows, by way of examples, that three types of explana-
tions are involved in the analysis of specific cases. The
fourth part (Chapters 12–15) sums up. The second part
(Chapters 5–8) views ‘cultures and representations as
sciences and collective norms’, the third one (Chapters
9–11) takes ‘the relational environment as context and
construction’. Behind these vague titles lurks one big
substantive statement, consisting of three layers provid-
ing better and better approximations. This reviewer
articulated them as the following falsifiable propositions:
(a) the actions of persons are adequate to the
intentions they have (this is close to what the
authors in Chapter 4 call the under-socialized
view of persons in rational choice theories),
(b) the actions of persons square with the shared
beliefs of the groups they belonged to when
young and conform to the norms of these
groups (what the authors call in Chapter 4 the
over-socialized view of 1950s sociology
textbooks),
(c) persons are more likely to take a new course of
action if that action already was performed by
an individual who belongs to their networks,
who has a higher status and who has more
outside links, and if that network contains
more holes (this proposition apparently is the
middle ground sought by the authors between
theories of under- and over-socialization).
These propositions are prompted by three series of
instructive examples. One series involves the diffusion
of a new type of maize among farmers, the prescrip-
tion of a new drug by physicians, and the buying of
new clothes by women (Chapter 1). The second one
pertains to two persons locked up separately by a
sheriff who suspects them of having robbed the mail-
coach together (Chapter 2). The third one invokes
cases of altruism, more precisely giving and receiving
various kinds of help between parents and their grown-
up children in contemporary France, as well as bread,
circuses and public buildings offered by wealthy
Roman citizens to their town (Chapter 3). Chapter 2
would have been more interesting for students if the
prisoners’ dilemma, usually taken as a two-person
game, had been turned into a three-person game, in
which the sheriff always wins and order in society gets
restored.
The second part of the book, after defining culture
as shared beliefs (Chapter 5), misses out on research
findings on group climate effects, as for instance
reported by Barton in the 1968 American Behavioral
Scientist. These results corroborate the (obvious)
hypothesis that a person’s actions are not only in
line with this person’s previous actions, but also live
up to the norms of this person’s environment. They
carry forth the Lazarsfeld-inspired series of examples
from Chapter 1 about the diffusion of innovation, and
avoid the problem that the phenomenon to be
explained and the phenomenon doing the explanation
both pertain to behavior, so that circularity might
occur (the authors warn against this danger of over-
socialization explanations on p. 146).
Chapter 6 turns into a useful list of instruments for
ascertaining the networks to which persons belong (for
instance: ask names of friends and ask whether they
know one another) and Chapter 7 into an equally
useful list of measurements for shared beliefs (resulting
in a ranking of countries after the percent of the
population with religious and postreligious values).
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Chapter 8 posits that there always are several contexts
and several cultures, and more or less leaves it at that.
The old Lazarsfeld hypothesis that cross-pressure
makes for nonvoting would have made a worthwhile
case, as well as the diagonal reference models presented
by Sobel in the 1981 American Sociological Review.
These models estimate the effect on the actions of
socially mobile persons of norms that differ between
origin and destination groups.
The third part of the book discusses a long quote
from Simmel (Chapter 9), but for some reason or
other avoids the related and more specific 1984 Blau
and Schwartz hypotheses on the effects of group size,
heterogeneity, inequality, and cross-cutting social
circles on who marries whom. Chapter 10 is most
interesting. It deals with the topic of how persons
influence their microenvironment (rather than the
other way around): persons who invest in a network
with holes climb up faster in their work organization,
people marry persons with characteristics like they
themselves have, and now that jobs make women
financially independent women divorce more
frequently.
The authors point out in Chapter 11 that markets
never are completely free by bringing in the idea of
trust. In this reviewer’s opinion, it is not necessary to
bring in the notion of trust. The present reviewer
convinced himself that buyers are not independent and
act as group members, by noting that a lot of people
buy a pine tree in December only and that other
people never eat pork. The authors also point out that
some persons at one and the same time belong to
several organizations, with the norms of one organiza-
tion (say, a political party) being inconsistent with
those of another (say, a church). Given these observa-
tions on markets and organizations, it is unfortunate
that the authors speak throughout about rational
choice theories. The application of these theories in
the field of religion made clear that the rationality
assumption is not that crucial, pivotal is that this
assumption is applied under the condition of the
existence of competitive markets. The tag ‘market
theory’ provides a nice contrast to the over-socializa-
tion hypothesis that organizational norms are always
strictly followed, and by this opposition it would have
become quite clear that networks are a middle ground.
This is the main theoretical contribution of this book,
which aims for synthesis.
In Chapter 12 of the final part of the book, the
authors return to their definition of purposive action
by maintaining that actions differ in the time elapsed
before they attain their intended results. Most human
actions have a short-term intention. To this reviewer,
this misjudges the place of religion in society, since
religions are far from dead and aim for individual
effects after death. Following the authors’ idea of a
well-filled tool box, the authors maintain (Chapter 13)
that ego had three types of intentions: respect of
values, access to social goods, and the wish to belong
to a group and to attain a higher status within it. They
also list three social goods: money, prestige, and
power. The authors are faintly aware that nowadays
this Weberian view of stratification has been replaced
by Neoweberianism, which holds that classes, parties,
and status groups are phenomena of a society’s power
relations, and that power relations determine a
person’s life chances.
The authors also discuss the question of why people
sometimes break rules (Chapter 14). This chapter looks
out of place, it should have been included in the third
part of the book. Also, their discussion of Merton’s
1938 propositions on anomie as a societal character-
istic making for various modes of individual adapta-
tion, should have been preceded by a discussion of
Hirschi’s 1968 attachment theory of juvenile
delinquency.
The authors finally list resources (Chapter 15):
human capital, cultural capital, economic capital, and
three types of social capital. One type has meaning on
the microlevel, another on the mesolevel, and yet
another one on the macrolevel. The first one stands for
the 1967 Beatles hypothesis that people get by with a
little help from their friends, and the second one for
the 1995 Burt hypothesis that people’s career prospers
more if their friends do not know each other. To this
reviewer, the hypothesis associated with the third type
remains unclear (just like Putnam’s Bowling alone from
2000 is ambiguous: if everybody plays bowling as a
member of a club, it still may be the case that blacks
and whites are bowling apart). This hypothesis might
be something like the following proposition, which
held for the Netherlands in the 1950s: in a society with
inhabitants who belong to different churches or other
mass organizations, who have hole-free social net-
works, but networks that do not tie into each other,
governments take more time to form after elections
and they more likely fall before their term is up.
It is a pity that the authors in Chapter 15 belittle the
distinction between resources and constraints. In this
reviewer’s opinion, sociologists too often assume that
people cannot have less than zero resources. (In
Resources for social change from 1971 Coleman
followed Olson and pinpointed negative resources.)
However, it is obvious that negative resources
(nescience rather than science, monetary debts rather
than wealth, foes rather than friends, and illegitimate
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rather than legitimate leisure life styles) are possible.
And the investigation of these topics might yield more
than that of familiar ones: do people take on a job that
pays less if their boss is too bossy (for an example, see
Moerbeek and Need in the 2003 Social Networks), do
children of parents who do not go to classical but to
pop concerts, do worse in school than children whose
parents do not visit concerts of either type?
For all these reasons the authors’ attempt at
synthesis does not fully succeed. Their cases always
are interesting, the examples do result into an array of
theories, but the authors miss several opportunities to
fill sociology’s toolbox to the brim. The prime reason
for this seems to be that the book wastes space on
making definitions and the comparison of definitions,
whereas those pages should have been used for outing
propositions. There are many more falsifiable proposi-
tions around than commonly assumed, and they
should be presented in textbooks.
The other reason is as follows. Boudon once
admitted that sociology is concerned with many
different topics, and the authors apparently think so
too. In this reviewer’s opinion, this is plain wrong.
Sociology’s big questions pertain to societies, to wit
their cohesion, the inequalities between their members,
and the speed of rationalization processes. And for
those who do not like this return to sociology’s
founders, there is another way of giving sociology’s
topics more coherence, particularly when sociology is
held to study purposive individual action, as is done in
the book under review. After all, sociology’s questions
often involve the unintended consequences of indivi-
dual action. A synthesis in sociology also comprises the
creation of order in the chaos of its topics.
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